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1Controversy and the United States military are old playmates. As far back as the legions under George
Washington, there has been the grumble of dissent associated with medical protection. Washington deemed
the need to variolate his forces. He had perceived a threat from smallpox and wanted to oer his troops
the utmost protection. He turned out to be right.1 Washington, D.C., has perceived the threat of anthrax
from any of several hostile parties. The oer of protection comes in the form of the Anthrax Vaccine
Immunization Program (\AVIP"). On 18 May 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen signed the Total
Force Immunization Directive to provide the Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (\AVA") to all active and reserve
Armed Forces members over a period of seven years. The question of whether Secretary Cohen was right is
one that has yet to be answered. Indeed, it is one for which many hope there will never be an answer. That
answer would come at the cost of an actual attack with anthrax. That is an answer we can live without.
The AVIP is a massive program to be enacted in three phases. Phase One involves providing initiation of
the vaccination sequence to troops deployed in high threat zones such as southwest Asia and the Korean
peninsula. This phase started immediately in 1998. Phase Two expanded the inception of vaccination
sequence to what are termed \early deploying forces." This is meant to include active service members as
well as Reserve members that would be among the rst to deploy to high threat areas in the event of conict
initiation. Initial projections placed Phase Two inception in early 2000. It is here that the greatest resistance
has been found, and the slowdown of the Program has been eected. Phase Three is the delivery of vaccine
to all remaining service members regardless of duty specications. This phase was to have been started in
2003.
Even prior to the program's inception, Secretary Cohen attached four conditions that had to be met before
1Dep't of Defense, Desk Reference on Vaccines and Immunity, November 1999
<http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/a...Exclinical/Desk Ref files/mvp-guide.htm>.
2proceeding. First was the supplemental retesting of all stockpiled vaccine to assure potency and safety.
Second was government oversight approval of the Program description for delivery of the vaccine and ac-
companying education of recipients. Third was the establishment of a unied system of tracking to insure
accurate dispensing and follow-up of vaccinations. Fourth was an independent, non-military review of the
entire Program, focusing on issues with health and medical aspects. By the middle of 1998, the Depart-
ment of Defense was satised that all four conditions had been met and proceeded to implement AVIP.
Subsequently, each of the four conditions has been challenged.
The AVIP was implemented to provide maximum protection of Armed Forces to a perceived threat of a
specic bioterrorism weapon. Controversy followed with haste. A groundswell of resistance soon manifested
itself throughout every portion of the Armed Forces. Soldiers were reluctant, or adamantly refusing to be
injected with the vaccine. Further review of the Program uncovered controversy and resistance on logistic,
moral, and legal grounds. It seemed the entire concept had been awed from the very start.
While it had certainly been expected that inoculating 2,400,000 troops with 15 million doses of vaccine
would prove to be dicult, the magnitude had indeed been underestimated. Problems with acquisition of
the necessary vaccine begot problems with the distribution of the vaccine, which were followed by problems
with the accurate tracking of the vaccine and recipients' sequence completion. Unanticipated resistance
from both the vaccine supplier and the recipient troops delay and confounded the smooth application of the
Program. The troubles were just starting.
When soldiers were ordered to accept the vaccine, there was some resistance. A shortage of background
information coupled with feelings of mistrust brought to light widespread fears of human rights violation.
Many service members are aware of the Nuremberg conventions and the prohibition of experimental testing
on humans without consent. It is often said that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. A little knowledge
3coupled with a callous response invokes instinctual self-preservation activity. All of these factors combined
to foment questions in the minds of recipients. These ideas questioned the morality of the Program. These
ideas added personal justication to refusing the vaccine.
Stemming from the moral questions, and encompassing the logistic diculties that arose, legal challenge to
the Program was mounted. Cases began to be tried that revolved around the use of an experimental drug
without informed consent. Other challenges attacked the vaccine as being misrepresented in its approved
use. Troubles even amounted from the alleged use of force to enact the directives of the Program. The
results were not what the Department of Defense had hoped for from the Program.
Legal challenge, personal resistance, poor implementation, loss of personnel, and developing health concerns
plagued the Program. Certainly these challenges were as much a threat as the potential of a hostile release
of the disease itself.
Anthrax: A Historic Epidemiology
In the smallest of packages comes the biggest of surprises. Such is certainly the case of any bacterial infection,
and exponentially so an organism as pathogenic as Bacillus anthracis. A scourge and plague upon mankind
and his domesticated ocks stretching back to the earliest records of mass disaster, this small round single-
celled threat may have been one of the original plagues of the Biblical Exodus. Indeed, as written records
improve with the passage of centuries, the possibility of such historical events as outbreaks of Blackleg
Plague are more closely tied to the small bug with the infamous association { anthrax. Physicians named
4the disease after the Greek word for charcoal, based upon the purple-black chancres that developed with
infection. Elaborate records began to emerge in Europe and the New World documenting disease in animals
and humans. There are French reports dating to at least 1829, and a case of treatment by a New York doctor
in 18092.
An enemy of many names, for a long time anthrax was named simply for the obvious symptom displayed
about the upper body of its victims. The large purple-black sores and open chancres gave rise to the
monikers malignante pustule, maladie charbonneuse, or simply charbon, or carbuncle. Then outbreaks began
to appear in the tannery industry, giving rise to the term \woolsorter's disease." Most curious was the sudden
appearance of anthrax in the early decades of the twentieth century. These were among persons that had
no contact with hide processing or agriculture, such as barbers and soldiers. These cases were subsequently
traced to the shaving brushes that had been produced from contaminated horsehair.
Scientic breakthroughs began to amass beginning in 1849, with the concurrent discoveries by Aloys-Antoine
Pollender, and Pierre Rayer with his disciple Casimir Davaine, of a large rod-shaped contaminant in the blood
of domestic animals felled by the charbon. The basic criteria for biological proof were met when contaminated
blood was injected into a healthy animal, resulting in its death from the same disease. The emerging eld
of microbiology seized upon this knowledge to treat such a deadly scourge. Noted German biologist Robert
Koch, later awarded the 1905 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for his work with tuberculosis, succeeded
in producing a pure (or reasonably so for the time) culture in 18763. His micrographs from this culture are
still used in many modern microbiology and epidemiology textbooks. His laboratory was the four-room at
he shared with his wife of the previous ten years. His tools were of his own creation, including the sharpened
2David Hosack, M.D. \A Case of Anthrax, Successfully Treated," C.S. van Winkle, New York (1809).
3Robert Koch, \Die Aetiologie der MilzbrandKrankheit, begrundet auf die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Bacillus Anthracis."
Beitrage zer Biologie der Ppanzen, Vol. 2, No. 2, pages 277-310 (1876).
5wood splinters that pre-dated hypodermic needles4. His time was split between his regular medical practice
and his personal quest for knowledge. His results are still cited today.
Using the work of Koch and Davaine5 as a starting point, and based upon his own discoveries of vaccination
with attenuated pathogens, the Great Doctor, Louis Pasteur, devised an anthrax vaccine all the way back in
1881. The production of immunologically active serum was then put to use in the treatment of woolsorter's
disease outbreaks in places such as the wool mills of the northeastern United States. A report on the
prevalence of anthrax in Massachusetts published in 19206 suggested that the best course of treatment
\...has been rest in bed, liquid diet and bichloride poultices combined with anthrax serum." This proved
to be of signicantly lower mortality than surgical removal of malignant pustules from the upper body and
head of victims. Indubitably, avoiding surgery also avoided a great deal of pain and scarring, especially with
the surgical techniques of the day.
One of the greatest discoveries about B. anthracis occurred in the 1950s. Previously, mortality was thought
to result from so-called \log-jam" eect of bacteria physically plugging capillaries in numbers of greater than
a billion per milliliter of blood. Researchers then found that only one third of one percent, or a mere three
million bacteria per milliliter, could result in death of an animal. Furthermore, the blood of a near-death
anthrax infected animal could be separated to provide serum with no bacteria. This serum could subsequently
induce anthrax-like symptoms in uninfected guinea pigs. An independent, diusable toxin must be at work.
However, the actual mechanism of action used by the toxin was unknown, until very recently. Research done
through the National Cancer Institute, and just recently published7, has implicated anthrax Lethal Factor
4Nobel Lectures, Physiology or Medicine 1901-1921 (Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam).
5LXI C. R. Acad. Sci, Observations Verbales Pr esent ees  a la Suite de la Communication de M. Davaine sur la
Maladie Charbonneuse, 506-512 (Sept. 25, 1865).
6Stanley H. Osborn, M.D., C.P.H., \Anthrax Problem in Massachusetts" (1920).
7Nicholas S. Duesbery,.et al., Proteolytic Inactivation of MAP-Kinase-Kinase by Anthrax Lethal Factor, 280 Science 734-737
(May 1, 1998).
6in the destruction of an enzyme called MAPKK, or mitogen-activated protein kinase. This is fatal to the
cells, and thus to the organism infected.
Needless to say, if the method of the enemy is a mystery, then avoidance is the best plan of action. During
the earlier part of the previous century, countries enacted methods of quarantines for animal products from
foreign contamination hotspots. Additionally, extensive research was put into nding a way to disinfect
the materials without damaging them and making them unusable. Several methods using acid solutions
were developed. In 19218, the British government detailed an extensive decontamination system based in
Liverpool. The memorandum even included oor plans and a projected budget for long range operations.
However, eective avoidance was not until mass production of high quality vaccine.
Even avoidance can be futile when the danger is being manipulated by hostile entities. As the Department
of Defense is fond of saying, bioterrorism weapons are real. The Cold War produced deadly research on both
sides of the Iron Curtain. Sometimes, however, things went awry. In 1979, the Russian research station
at Sverdlovsk experienced an accidental leak of anthrax into the neighborhood9. Dierent reports exist,
but somewhere around 64 to 67 humans and far more numerous domestic animals died from exposure to
the bacteria. Apparently, a lter had been accidentally left o of a ventilator to the facility, permitting
contaminated air to be vented to the outside. The classically stern Soviet Union denied the accident for
years, until glasnost opened the region to outside view. Subsequent analysis determined that the more than
one hundred cases of anthrax had been co-located to a narrow downwind swath at the exact time of the
day of the leak. Perhaps more frightening is a deliberate release of dangerous agents on an unsuspecting
populace. During the recent trial of the Japanese doomsday cult, Aum Shinrikyo, it was revealed10 that the
8\Memorandum on the Disinfecting Station Established in Great Britain for Disinfection of Wool and Hair," His Majesty's
Stationary Oce (1921).
9Matthew Methelson, et. al, The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979, Science, 1202-1208 (November 18, 1994).
10SOWING DEATH: A special report.; How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1998, at A1.
7terrorists had attempted to release anthrax onto unsuspecting citizens at various sites. The trial was only
for the sarin gas releases in the Tokyo subway, but revealed far more than that. Indeed, the cult tried to
spread several dierent types of bioterrorism agents. Members had even been sent on missions to Africa to
nd samples of Ebola virus. There have even been attempts at bioterrorism activity inside the border of the
United States. In 1998, an individual by the name of Larry Wayne Harris was arrested in Nevada11 when
it was believed he was carrying B. anthracis spores. Mr. Harris had been previously arrested in 1995 for
mail fraud when he procured Bubonic Plague from a scientic facility called the American Type Culture
Collection (\ATCC"). Mr. Harris had also been previously linked to the supremacist group Aryan Nation.
With recent census data suggesting that whites are no longer the majority in large urban regions such as
New York and San Francisco, the threat of violence by an immoral group armed with a weapon of mass
destruction should indeed strike a note of fear in the heart. Fortunately, it was later revealed in this case
that Mr. Harris was simply in possession of the anthrax vaccine.
From its rumored use in the Gulf War, stretching back through the mists of history to its ravages of Old World
populations, anthrax has been a formidable enemy. The tiny bug with the devastating consequence has, and
will, haunt us from the hands of man and nature both. Great strides have been made in the understanding
of the causality. This knowledge is the key weapon in the containment, control, and continued vigilance
against potential disaster.
11T. M. Edwards, Catching a 48-Hour Bug, Time, March 2, 1998.
8Anthrax: A Technical Representation
Bacillus anthracis is a single-celled eukaryotic organism similar in appearance to several other Bacillus
species such as B. cereus, B. subtilis, and the buttery larva pathogen B. thuringiensis. All these bugs share
a cylindrical, or rod, morphology approximately ve to ten microns (micrometers, or millionths of a meter)
in length and about one micron in diameter. In a liquid suspension, such as they are found naturally in the
blood, they form longer clumps and chains held together by sticky molecules called glycoproteins. These
glycoproteins are a distinguishing characteristic of bacteria designated \Gram-positive" by the ability of the
cell to be stained with a concoction of dyes known as the \Gram Stain." B. anthracis has been demonstrated
to have the potential to grow in the absence or presence of oxygen, technically termed a facilitative anaerobe.
The most remarkable, and certainly the most threatening aspect of the bacteria is the ability to form what are
called endospores, or more commonly just spores. These spores are a sort of suspended animation form of the
bacteria that can survive without air or water for extensive lengths of time (centuries) in extreme conditions
of temperature. Because of this spore-forming ability, B. anthracis can hide and avoid decontamination,
re-emerging when conditions are advantageous to resume a career of pestilence. There are reports of anthrax
contamination still present at the Sverdlovsk site, as well as 19th century outbreaks in Europe. Anthrax
spores could even be a sort of explanation for legends such as a mummy's curse. The spores could be laying
dormant on the hair and hides buried in a tomb, awakening when some foolish explorer enacts his raid. Alas,
he mysteriously dies at a later date from a horrible conagration of black boils.
B. anthracis causes anthrax12. Anthrax is a disease of warm-blooded vertebrates, particularly domestic
12Koch, supra note 3.
9grazing animals, but also wild relatives, birds, and humans. Two basic forms of the disease exist. The rst,
and far more common, is a cutaneous, or surface infection. Statistics about infection rates are spotty, but
estimates are that somewhere around 1200 to 2000 infections occur each year globally. There have been
fewer than a dozen cases in the United States in the past decade. This occurs when B. anthracis enters the
body through a breach in the natural barrier of the skin into the vibrant tissue just beneath, such as when
handling dead animals, or from natural hair shaving brushes. The spores or active Bacilli begin to grow
rapidly at the site of entry. The wound quickly develops a distinctive liquidy swelling, or gelatinous edema.
Within a short 12-36 hour period, this turns into a papule, or pocket of growing
bacteria that manifests as a small bump on the skin surface. As the papule lls with dying cells and uid,
it is called a vesicle, which will be dubbed a malignant pustule when it starts to ooze through the skin. The
nal stage of this acute infection is the development of a open sore ringed with rotting tissue, sometimes
called a necrotic ulcer, or carbuncle. These are large purple-black chancres, often localized to the upper
exposed regions such as the neck and arms. From here, B. anthracis may escape into the infected hosts
bloodstream, inducing system-wide infection (septicemia) and swelling (edema). Within seven days, it is
fatal. Ingested B. anthracis will cause a similar infection of the gastrointestinal tract. Some ocials classify
this as a distinct form of the disease simply because it is internal instead of on the surface skin. This is a
misrepresentation. Both forms are epithelial in nature, and dierent from inhalation infection.
B. anthracis is far more dangerous when the spores are inhaled into the lungs and directly enter the blood-
stream of the victim. This is a rarer type of exposure, often the result of occupational exposure as dust on
infected animal hides or bioterrorism. Within hours, the victim experiences high fever and extreme chest
pain, with septicemia, edema, and internal hemorrhaging quickly leading to death. Death is 99% certain in
10exposed individuals without previous vaccination or antibiotic treatment.
How B. anthracis kills has been long researched. Initially, the relatively large size of the bacterium was
thought to cause a sort of \log-jam" as they coalesced in the delicate network of blood vessels. Later,
scientists determined that even a few bacteria could kill, and theorized a chemical product was at work.
This was demonstrated by ltering the bacteria out of infected blood and re-injecting into healthy animals.
The ltered blood could cause death. Further research determined that the B. anthracis produces three
soluble proteins called protective antigen, edema factor, and lethal factor, or LF in the parlance of scientic
alphabet soup. These proteins were shown to associate in pairs to form what were dubbed Lethal Toxin and
Edema Toxin. The actual killer here is the Lethal Toxin13, which is made up of protective antigen and LF.
Protective antigen was found to be in both toxins, and formed the basis of the currently available vaccine.
How LF acted remained a mystery until nearly the end of the twentieth century. Based upon similarities to
other known proteins, it came to be thought that LF was a metalloprotease, capable of cutting an essential
protein in cells. At long last14, researchers discovered the target substrate as MAPKK. This target is a
family of molecules vital for the housekeeping and maintenance of every cell in the body. Without a whole,
functioning MAPKK, the cell dies. Without enough living cells, the animal dies. It is hoped that this new
knowledge of the method of action will aid in the development of new treatment schemes for anthrax.
13R.E. Lincoln & D.C. Fish, Anthrax Toxin, Microbial Toxins (Montie, Kadis, and Ajl, eds., Acad. Press, New York).
14See Duesbery, supra note 7.
11Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed: A Technical Examination
A vaccine is a biological product designed for prophylactic protection from disease by stimulation and
education of the victim's own immune system in advance of pathogenic challenge. Vaccines have been a
part of western medicine for centuries, and used in primitive form for millennia. Midwives and doctors
from the Middle Ages would expose patients to diseased blood or scabs to stimulate the immune response.
Scientic advancement brought renement for injectible protectants by the likes of Louis Pasteur. Pasteur
demonstrated eective use of attenuated, or weakened, pathogens as a source material for personal protection
from such scourges of the day as smallpox, measles, and anthrax. To reduce the chance of accidental infection
with fully pathogenic material, which could be fatal, doctors learned to macerate or lter the innoculum
to fragment or remove cells. This leaves behind a slurry of cellular proteins and components that can
all stimulate immune responses. The advent of recombinant DNA technology allowed renement of the
innoculum by eliminating unnecessary ingredients. In these cases, a pure solution of a protein found on
the surface of a dangerous bacterium or virus could be injected into a person to elicit the required immune
response. Modern vaccines commonly use recombinant material to increase potency and batch consistency.
Modern vaccines may also contain additives called adjuvants that enhance immune response by the body's
cells. Some modern vaccination schemes may also combine multiple pathogens into a single injection. Almost
all vaccinations require more than one injection over time to increase the strength of the immune response,
or maintain the ability of the system to respond upon challenge { sometimes called a booster.
The Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed that is produced by BioPort, Incorporated is a ltered, non-recombinant
solution of avirulent non-encapsulated15 B. anthracis laboratory culture. Even though a supposedly non-
hazardous strain of bacterium is used, ltration removes any whole cells. This leaves behind the protein
15Package Insert, Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed, BioPort, Inc., Lansing, Michigan (1999).
12called protective antigen, or PA. Protective antigen is a surface protein of B. anthracis that has been shown
to stimulate an immune response in mammals. Additionally, the package insert states that the vaccine
contains a certain limit of aluminum hydroxide, formaldehyde, and benzethonium chloride as preservatives.
Information is lacking on the complete composition of the vaccine as it is bottled and distributed. This
means that there could be far more chemicals and proteins in there than are suggested.
It is stated on the package insert that the vaccine is prepared from ltered culture medium. Although
this medium, or growth solution, is called \synthetic," it may be chock full of salts, chemicals, hormones,
and other molecules that could eect reactions upon introduction into the human body. Commonly, FDA
approved vaccines include on the package the complete composition of the solution, or a reference to where
the entire recipe can be found. Since most proteins can be dissolved in either water or oil, it is far more
common to purify the important vaccine component and provide that component suspended in pure sterile
water or a lipid (fat) solution such as Lipofectin.16 There are, however, reasons why this may not be done.
Primarily is the diculty in purifying the desired antigen. This is rarely true with modern tools such as
High Performance Liquid Chromatography or supercritical CO2 extraction. Second is the desire to produce
a vaccine containing more than one distinct antigen. This stimulates the immune system to produce several
types of antibody, which is often advantageous. This is, still, avoidable by careful distillation of the culture
to remove unwanted components.
It is important to note that all of these methods are functional on an extremely large scale as needed to
provide product to the masses. It is also important to note that producing a vaccine by mere ltration
of a growth culture mandates a high degree of quality control testing. Without constant examination, the
amount of antigen in any given batch of vaccine can uctuate greatly. A low amount of antigen will result
16Bethesda Research Laboratories, Gaithersburg, MD.
13in insucient stimulation of the immune system, eectively leaving the individual unprotected.
Aside from the confusing composition alluded to in the package insert; there are dosage instructions that
call for a series of six injections over 18 months, with yearly booster injections to maintain immunity. This is
a poor ecacy indicator. Vaccines such as measles and pertussis rarely require boosters, and even the most
common booster given, tetanus, is reserved for every ve to ten years, depending on previous inoculation
records. Asking for a yearly re-immunization is akin to stating the weakness in the vaccine.
A third issue that has been raised about this particular vaccine is the eectiveness vaccination provides
against dierent subspecies, or strains, of B. anthracis. Commonly, dierent strains (analogous to races)
of a species are categorized by minute dierences in the cell surface proteins, such as protective antigen.
Antibodies to the protective antigen of one strain of B. anthracis may not confer resistance to a slightly
dierent strain. This is of special consideration in the age of genetic manipulation of bacteria when hostile
entities can create strains of bacteria never seen in nature17. However, certain portions of a protein must be
consistent to insure proper function of that protein. These are called conserved regions. Antibodies to the
conserved portion of protective antigen should provide immune response to all strains of B. anthracis.
Several of these aws could be easily addressed by the use of recombinant DNA technology in the production
of pure solutions of protective antigen. This technology was available in 1991 from researchers18 at the U.S.
Army research center at Fort Detrick, Maryland. This technology subsequently failed to receive adequate
funding19 and the program scrapped.
17A technique of particular danger is pseudotyping, whereby a bacterium is modied so that it resembles another entirely
dierent species or Genus but retains a large portion of its original genetic capability. Imagine a helpful bug like E. coli with
the genes of esh eating S. aureus.
18L.C. Iacono-Connors, et. al, Protection Against Anthrax with Recombinant Virus-Expressed Protective Antigen in Experi-
mental Animals, 59(6) Infect Immun., 1961-65 (June 1991).
19Testimony of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director Special Studies and Evaluations, Nat'l Security and Int'l A. Division of the
Gov't Accounting Oce, before Subcomm. on Nat'l Security, Veterans' A. and Int'l Relations, Comm. on Gov't Reform,
House of Representatives (July 21, 1999).
14By denition, a vaccine is designed to cause a reaction, that being the stimulation of the host immune
system to be prepared for a future challenge by pathogenic antigen-bearing invaders. Concomitant with
this reaction are several indications that are present to a varying degree. These may fall into the category
of adverse reactions when they are generally undesirable. Examples common to nearly all vaccines are the
presence of a sore and raise bump at the injection site, slight tinnitus, or ringing of the ears, and general
queasiness or a feeling of slight malaise. These are the result of localized and systemic stimulation of
non-specic immune system components that respond to any and all foreign challenge. These are rarely
hazardous, but in a few cases escalate to anaphylactic shock, which can be fatal. This shock can be treated
by the administering physician immediately and successfully.
Some vaccines produce additional reactions in some individuals. These may include extended nausea, chills
and sweats, dizziness and blackouts, and longer term muscle soreness. Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed has been
implicated in all these reactions as well. Additionally, some recipients have reported excessive swelling of
hands and feet, numbness, photosensitivity, auto-immune disorder, miscarriage, and fetal trisomy. BioPort
itself professes not to have any data relating to the eect of the vaccine in regards to carcinogenicity,
teratogenicity, or impairment of fertility. These are indeed all elements to add mistrust of the vaccine. By
most standards, the BioPort Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed is consistent with immunization products from the
rst half of the twentieth century, not the start of the 21st century.
15Logistical Diculties of the AVIP
On 18 May 1998, Secretary of Defense Cohen signed the Total Force Immunization Directive to provide the
Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (\AVA") to all active and reserve Armed Forces members over the period of
seven years, including new recruits. Simply put, this means every member of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines, Coast Guard, Army Reserves, Navy Reserves, and Air National Guard will receive the series of six
injections of AVA, regardless of active duty, impending retirement, or new enlistment. The massive scale
of this program necessitated classication of three levels of immediacy for distributing the available vaccine
supply. Force members were classied into three phases relative to their imminent threat of exposure by time
spent in several \hot spots" such as the Korean peninsula, or the Saudi peninsula. Immediately, concerns
were raised by military members and civilian lawyers about the logistical diculties of a program of such
massive size.
It is estimated that the program will vaccinate more than 2,400,000 members of the Armed Forces by the year
2005. Simple math dictates that this is more than 15 million doses of AVA, solely for the initial immunization.
This does not account for the yearly booster shots as needed. By January 2000, only about 1.4 million doses
had been dispensed. At that rate, the seven-year mark would see less than half the required number of
inoculations given to service members. This is far short of predictions and aspirations that the Department
of Defense has put forth. This is despite the allocation of doses for immediate use in soldiers deploying or
currently deployed in southwest Asia or the Middle East. As policy currently stands, these primary risk
troops were to have been given at least one of the six injections prior to being deployed. Statistics on the
actual percentage of deployed troops that have had their shots seems to be dicult to access. Instead,
16there exist numerous cases of refusal of vaccine at domestic Reserve force bases. This suggests that the
necessary doses are not going to the designated rst wave of inoculees. Additionally, by deploying soldiers
with only one of six in a series of shots adds to the degree of diculty in ensuring the proper receipt of
the remaining ve shots. Recipients need to be carefully tracked and notied when to get each subsequent
injection. By admission of the Pentagon, this has been lax.20 Although statistics can be easily manipulated,
the Department of Defense suggests that 70 to 90 percent of service members are given a shot within 30
days of schedule. This sounds reassuring until it is noted that the rst three shots of the sequence are given
at 14-day intervals, meaning that 30% of the deployed troops may be missing one or two of their shots.
The Department of Defense is attempting to track vaccine administration by use of a computerized system
called \DEERS", or Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System. This collects data from the separate
military branches, each of which maintains a distinct system of records. The Army uses its Medical Protec-
tion System database (\MEDPROS"). The Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard use the Shipboard Automated
Medical System (\SAMS"). The Navy Reserve uses a system called \RSTARS". The Air Force uses its Mil-
itary Immunization Tracking System (\MITS"). It is errors and ineciency in data entry that spokespeople
for the AVIP invoke when suggestions of tardy and incomplete tracking arise. Great eort is being spent to
update and correlate the database, but it is not enough. The tracking and timely dispensation of vaccine
among a highly mobile force is inherently awed by slow communication, human discrepancies in reporting,
and tight constraints on vaccine administration timing. Of course, this would have greater impact if there
were even enough vaccine to go around.
By its own admission, the Department of Defense does not have enough anthrax vaccine for all 2.4 million
troops. Because of this shortfall, a slowdown21 of the program was announced at the end of November 2000.
20Testimony of Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve A., to Subcomm. on Nat'l
Security, Veterans A., and Int'l Relations, Comm. on Gov't Reform, U.S. House of Representatives (September 29, 1999).
21DefenseLink, December 1, 2000.
17It is hoped that by delaying the administration of vaccine to its troops, the Department can receive more
from the sole supplier, BioPort, Incorporated. This seems unlikely, faced with the troubles that BioPort has
been having with the Food and Drug Administration, its creditors, and its own employees.
In 1990, 1991, and 1998, BioPort was awarded successive contracts22 for the production of over 15 million
doses of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed. However, the plant was closed and renovated in 1998 at the request
of the FDA, who found numerous deciencies upon inspection23. Eleven lots of vaccine were placed in
quarantine to be retested for ecacy. It has since reopened, and has announced the desire to meet the
contracts, but is currently in negotiations over the price per dose of the vaccine. Whether BioPort will be
able to meet the demand has yet to be seen, but at the current time, insucient doses have been supplied
to the Program.
Furthermore, BioPort has had some nancial diculties come to light. In his testimony before The Sub-
committee on National Security, Veterans Aairs, and International Relations of the House Committee on
Government Reform given June 30, 1999, Mr. Fuad El-Hibri, President and Chief Executive Ocer of Bio-
Port, brought to light several nancial woes currently being suered by the company. He noted that vaccine
costs far outweigh the agreed-upon price of the Defense contracts and that \BioPort has incurred losses at
a rate that cannot be sustained in the future." This has engendered fears of inferior vaccine production by
a failing company being utilized in the Program. The Department of Defense responded by giving BioPort
$24.1 million in contractual relief, including $18.7 million as an interest-free advance payment, and thus
more than doubled BioPort's per-dose price, from $4.36 to $10.64.24 Despite the infusion of such massive
22DAMD17-90-C-0159 for 700,000 doses ($4.7M), DAMD17-91-C-1139 for 6,300,000 doses ($33.5M), and DAMD17-98-C-8052
for 8,690,000 doses (total) ($29.108M).
23Statement of Kathryn C. Zoon, Ph.D., Director Center For Biologics Evaluation And Research, Food And Drug Adminis-
tration, before the Comm. On Armed Services, U.S. Senate (July 12, 2000).
24Pentagon Subsidy To Anthrax Vaccine Company Raises Questions, Hartford Courant, June 17, 2000, at A11.
18sums to bring the Lansing, Michigan site up to code, all vaccine from the second suite awaits FDA approval
before shipping. This eectively hampers the production schedule at BioPort, aecting their ability to meet
the Defense contract timeline.
To add to the troubles of the company, three former employees had led suit seeking royalties25 on vaccine
sold. These employees claim to have made signicant modications to the production process while working
at Michigan Biological Products, Incorporated (\MBPI"), the State-run predecessor to BioPort. This has
dual repercussions, as the potential lawsuit may force greater nancial hardship on a struggling company,
and the revelation of modied manufacturing process invites further FDA scrutiny. Even though the lawsuit
was not awarded, BioPort has still given the perception of loss of accountability and poor self-regulation.
A third powerful element of the logistics of the AVIP relates in part to the tracking and record keeping
activities of the issuing branches of the Armed Forces. One of the stipulations placed upon dispensing the
vaccine was an accurate and fair method of tracking long-term health eects of recipients. It was deemed
important to know if people got sick from this vaccine as their lives and careers progressed, no one wanted
to repeat the poor medical record keeping of those who served in the Persian Gulf War, records that often
didn't report shots received.26 The Department of Defense correctly perceived the massive scope of this
follow-up, and applied the use of a previously existing method designed by the FDA for reporting adverse
reactions to any vaccine given by any doctor throughout the United States. This system, called Vaccine
Adverse Event Reporting System (\VAERS"), involves a patient seeing a doctor after receiving vaccine and
noticing a reaction. It is what is termed a passive database, placing the onus of reporting on the patients
themselves and absolving the administering agency of direct tracking. It is also fraught with weaknesses,
25Lansing State Journal, December 5, 2000.
26Sen. Comm. on Veterans' Aff., 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Is Military Research Hazardous to Veterans' Health?
Lessons Spanning Half a Century, S. Rep. No. 103-97 (Dec. 8, 1994).
19especially in a setting such as the military that thrives on regimented command and following orders. Simply
put, patients are not encouraged to report adverse reactions by application of peer pressure, by withholding
access to reporting materials, and by utilizing misplaced trust in superior ocers. Through this system, it
can be expected that adverse reactions will be severely underreported.
To summarize the logistic problem facing the Department of Defense in instituting the Anthrax Vaccine
Immunization Program, there are not enough doses, doctors, or opportune moments to successfully complete
the basic stages of the Program, much less the necessary follow-up maintenance program and long-term
assessments. However, this being a military operation, logistics be damned.
Moral Troubles of the AVIP
The world of medicine is inundated with issues of morality and ethical conduct.
Misdiagnoses, abortion rights, euthanasia, health insurance related refusal of care, untested medicines with
slowly realized dangers (e.g., thalidomide), and the use of unwilling test subjects all threaten medical prac-
titioners constantly. Basic human morality tells us that before we give any medicine to a patient, we need
to obtain permission, thoroughly inform the patient, and observe and treat any undesired eects of the
medicine. These tenets are mandatory for even purpose-bred rodents. These should certainly be applied to
anyone willing to lay down his life in defense of our freedom.
Military service has always been known to exact a cost. The benets of life in a free society are paid for
by the potential for loss of life and the accession to comply with the orders of others. It is veriable that
20not all orders are justied. Certainly, mistakes have been made in the past with medical programs. In
1932, the Tuskegee experiments with syphilis began. During the decades following the Second World War,
experiments were conducted in the United States on the eects of atomic radiation on soldiers. The war in
Vietnam brought the danger of Agent Orange into focus and the ability of the Government to cover-up its
errors. The dawn of the last decade of the twentieth century saw the United States embroiled in the Gulf
War, where the saga of forced anthrax inoculation begins, along with the use of other agents27, specically
pyridostigmine and botulinum toxin, without prior informed consent. Is it any wonder that a certain degree
mistrust pervades any mandatory military medical program? The Nuremberg principles were specically
developed to prevent forced human subject experimentation. No member of the United States Armed Forces
wants to be part of any program with echoes of Nazi human rights violations.
Many of the complaints have centered on the perceived lack of information set forth by the Department of
Defense when the AVIP was instituted. Initially, only vague reassurance from the sta doctor, and \That's
an order!" directives from superior ocers, were the only knowledge soldiers had of what was being done
to them. Later, a small pamphlet called What Every Service Member Should Know About the Anthrax
Vaccine was distributed with administration of the vaccine. Humans, being naturally curious, and Americans,
being stubbornly independent, began to research the vaccine for themselves. This self-motivated exploration
exposed many of the basic concerns that vaccine refusers have reiterated throughout the controversy. Those
are fear of health damage from the vaccine, career damage from side eects of the vaccine, and a sense of a
loss of free will.
The fear of collateral health damage from administration of unknown and untested agents is a basic fear
27Id.
21of humankind: don't eat the poison berries! Again, the mistrust aspect surfaces because the military has
a history of knowingly exposing its constituents to hazardous products, all in the name of national safety.
Additionally, the Reservist component of the Armed Forces now has to contend with the possibility that
actions taken during military duty will greatly aect life o-duty. This was distinctly expressed by members of
the Air National Guard who are also employed as commercial pilots. When reports of adverse reactions arose
indicating dizziness and loss of peripheral tactile sense, these y-boys knew that they couldn't jeopardize
their civilian careers for the military. Such was a similar reaction upon hearing that civilian health insurance
would not provide coverage for illness stemming from the vaccine.
To ignore the complaints of constituents is dangerous. Indeed, we know that if we put our hand in a re,
the pain tells our brain to move it out. If we ignore the messages of pain, we suer even more. Similarly,
to ignore and trivialize the misgivings of a large number of vaccine candidates can burn the whole military.
This is indeed what happened with AVIP. Repeatedly, adverse reactions and fears about the Program were
met with disbelief, disdain, or ridicule. That is surely a result that can only harm the Department as a
whole. By labeling vaccine refusers as malingerers or troublemakers, the military disrupts their own order
and trust in command.
The AVIP was designed to provide a unied front against attack by a biological weapon. Instead, it has been
a weapon of its own in the fractious and morally questionable reduction of troop morale, willingness, and
trust. Losing any of these components weakens the military unacceptably. With the moral paucity displayed
by superior ocers, the commoner vaccine recipients have chosen to express their own moral outrage by
refusal of treatment. If you can't trust the government, who can you trust?
Legal Issues
22Federal regulation of vaccines in the United States
The rst federal action taken with regard to vaccines was in direct response to the shattering eects of
smallpox on U.S. citizens. In 1813 Congress called for President James Madison \to appoint an agent to
preserve the vaccine matter [i.e., smallpox vaccine] and to furnish the same to any citizen of the United
States."28 Congress further empowered Madison to establish a National Vaccine Agency, and required the
U.S. Post Oce to carry mail up to one-half ounce containing the vaccine material at no charge.29
The rst modern legislation to control the quality of pharmaceutical products was passed by Congress in 1902
and entitled the Biologics Control Act. The act created the Hygienic Laboratory of the U.S. Public Health
Service to control all biological products imported, exported, or engaged in interstate commerce. Although
for a period of time these functions were performed under the National Institute of Health's Division of
Biological Standards, enforcement of the Biologics Control Act is now under authority of the FDA Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).30 FDA's stated mission in this realm is to \protect and
enhance the public health through regulation of biological products including blood, vaccines, therapeutics
and related drugs and devices according to statutory authorities."31
28Dep't of Defense, supra note 1.
29Id.
30See Public Health Service Act x351, 42 U.S.C.A. x262. (West 1999).
31See FDA website, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (visited April 21, 2001) <http://www.fda.gov/cber/>.
23The AVA, as currently used, requires classication as an IND under
FDA standards
Although the Department of Defense insists that the FDA has determined the anthrax vaccine as used in the
Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program is not an investigational new drug (IND), but rather an approved
drug being used in accordance with its approved label, there is evidence to contradict this.32
The Department of Defense alleges that failure to specically include inhalation exposure on the AVA label
is the source of most of the confusion surrounding the anthrax vaccine. It maintains that the Department
has long interpreted the label as encompassing inhalation and that such omission is easily explained due to
a lack of need to distinguish between routes of exposure, i.e., spores entering the body through the skin,
being breathed (such as in dust from animal hides or medical equipment), or being ingested. According to
the Department of Defense, vaccinating troops headed for the Persian Gulf was done with the FDA's full
knowledge.33
The Department explains the 1996 IND application led by BioPort's predecessor Michigan Biological Prod-
ucts Institute as part of a research initiative to determine whether a satisfactory level of protection against
anthrax could be achieved with intramuscular injections on an abbreviated shot schedule. The application
included a proposed study of the eectiveness of the vaccine against inhalation exposure (using an animal
model) under the investigational, two intramuscular shot schedule. It was also hoped to ocially list in-
32Dep't of Defense, Information About the Anthrax Vaccine and the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP), (March
15, 2001) <http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/Ed products/Infopaper/Infopaper.htm>.
33Id.
24halation exposure as a label indication.34 Others, including Connecticut Representative Christopher Shays,
Attorney General Blumenthal, and scores of military servicemen ercely contest this proposition.
In a press release dated March 22, 2001, Connecticut Attorney General Blumenthal noted that the sole license
for the manufacturing of AVA (obtained by Michigan Biological Products Institute/ BioPort) was obtained
exclusively for use in agricultural and veterinary settings as protection against cutaneous contact anthrax. It
never underwent proper testing nor received approval for protection against pulmonary (airborne) anthrax,
the threat the Military claims provides ample justication for its Total Force Immunization Program.35 This
change in the target use of the vaccine is inconsistent with its original licensing and thus qualies AVA as
an Investigational New Drug (IND) under FDA standards.36 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly
held that 21 U.S.C. x 321(p)(1) mandates new drug status for any drug not generally recognized as being
safe and eective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended or suggested in the labeling.37 As
an IND, the vaccine may not be administered to service members without their informed, voluntary consent.
Furthermore requiring service members to be vaccinated with a biologic product unlicensed for its current
use violates the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
The addition of squalene provides further justication for classifying AVA as an IND.
There is controversy surrounding whether or not squalene, used in vaccines to foster faster, stronger and
longer protective reactions, was at some point added to the anthrax vaccine, either by BioPort or the
34Id.
35Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Asks Secretary Of Defense, FDA To Drop Military's Anthrax
Vaccination Program, March 22, 2001.
36See generally, What Is A New Drug Within the Meaning of x 201(p) of the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act, 133 A.L.R.
Fed. 229 (1999).
37U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), 552-53.
25Department of Defense.38 The FDA has not approved its use in AVA.39 The military vehemently denied the
presence of squalene in the anthrax vaccine until recent FDA tests revealed squalene was found in ve lots
of the vaccine. The Defense Department now admits to the presence of squalene in the vaccine, but claims
the amount is innitesimally small and poses no threat to safety. Their main justication is that the amount
of squalene in the vaccine cannot be harmful as this amount is smaller than that produced naturally in the
body.40 This reasoning, however, is awed.
The mere fact that something is safe when eaten or applied topically does not necessarily mean that it poses
no threat when loaded into a syringe. \A molecule in the body sequestered from the immune system appears
as foreign to that immune system when it is nally exposed to it as a molecule from outside the self."41 The
risk of immune response leading to devastating destruction of healthy tissues warrants greater investment in
long-term adjuvant toxicology studies and the addition of such an agent into AVA certainly provides further
justication for rendering it an IND.
The Department of Defense Total Force Vaccination Program, by
mandating service members to receive an IND, violates federal law
The federal statute mandating receipt of informed consent from members of the Armed Forces prior to the
administration of investigational drugs (which arguably include the anthrax vaccine) is entitled \Notice of
38Additive Found in Anthrax Vaccine, Hartford Courant, Sept. 28, 2000.
39Additive Found in Anthrax Vaccine Questioned; Two Congressmen Initiate Probe at Hearing, Hartford Courant, Oct.
4, 2000.
40Dept. of Defense, Information About the Anthrax Vaccine and the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP),
(March 15, 2001) <http://www.anthrax.osd.mil/Site Files/Ed products/Infopaper/Infopaper.htm>.
41Pamela B. Asa, \Rebuttal Letter Concerning Disinformation Surrounding Her Work `Antibodies to Squalene in Gulf
War Syndrome"' <http://www.enter.net/jfsorg/OcialDocuments les/DrAsa.htm>; Pamela B. Asa, et. al., Antibodies to
Squalene in Gulf War Syndrome, 68 Experimental and Molecular Pathology 58-64 (February 2000).
26Use of an Investigational New Drug or a Drug Unapproved for its Applied Use." Codied in 10 U.S.C. x1107
(1999), the statute requires the Secretary of Defense to provide any member of the Armed Forces who is
to receive an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use with written notication
that the drug being administered is an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use,
the reason(s) why such drug is being administered, and information regarding the possible side eects of
the drug, including any known side eects possible as a result of the drug's interaction with other drugs or
treatments. Such information must be given to the service member prior to the drug's initial administration.
Only the President is empowered to waive the informed consent requirement imposed under 505(i)(4) of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act42 for members of the Armed Forces receiving such drugs in connection
with their participation in a particular military operation.
4221 U.S.C. 355(i)(4).
27Then-President Clinton considered the subject important enough to warrant the issuance of an Executive
Order on September 30, 1999. Executive Order 13139, \Improving Health Protection of Military Personnel
Participating in Particular Military Operations," requires the Department of Defense to obtain informed
consent from any member of the Armed Forces prior to administering him an investigational drug. Waivers
of informed consent are only issued in extreme circumstances and at the President's sole discretion in
accordance with 10 U.S.C. 1107(f). The President may only grant such a waiver upon determining that
obtaining informed consent is either an impossibility, contrary to the best interests of the recipient, or
counter to national security interests.43 The President has issued no such waivers to date.44
Air Force Instruction 40-403, \Clinical Investigations in Medical Research Guidance and Procedures" (May
19, 1994) similarly calls for Air Force give their written informed consent prior to receiving any INDs. The
instruction further state that usage of any FDA approved drug in a manner other than that provided for in
FDA approved indications is to be considered an \investigational use."
Voluntary and informed consent is a crucial element of any human experimentation. The Nuremberg Code
requires that experimental subjects have sucient knowledge and comprehension of the elements involved,
including the nature, duration and purpose of the experiment, to be able to make an enlightened and
voluntary decision.45 The principles of the Nuremberg Code prohibit the Department of Defense from
conducting large-scale investigations on members of the Armed Services.46 The Declaration of Helsinki47
and the Common Rule of the U.S. Government48 call for similar measures.
43See 21 C.F.R. xx 50, 312 (1999).
44The Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program - What Have We Learned?: Hearings Before the Comm. on Gov't Reform,
October 3, 2000 (Statement of John J. Michels, Jr.).
45The Nuremberg Code, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, U.S. Gov't Printing Off.,
Washington D.C. (1948).
4650 U.S.C. x1520(a) (1999).
47T. A. Mappes & J. S. Zembaty, Declaration of Helsinki, World Medical Assoc., Biomedical Ethics 211-13 (3rd Ed.,
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991).
48Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Federal Register 28,002 { 28,032 (June 18, 1991). (The Common
Rule calls proscribes the use of federal funds for research involving human experimentation, unless the subject gives his informed
28Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, all medical products require approval by the Food and Drug
Administration prior to being sold and distributed in the U.S. or given to U.S. troops stationed in foreign
countries. Under current law, an unapproved or investigational drug or vaccine can only be administered
by the Department of Defense in accordance with ocial Investigational New Drug (IND) protocol.49 Of-
cial IND procedure requires voluntary, informed consent and carefully controlled conditions allowing for
evaluation of safety and ecacy.
Side Eects
Dr. Frank Fisher, a lieutenant colonel at the Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, described his experience
as something out of the X-les. While waiting in a line of fellow servicemen for a typhoid vaccination in
1993, Dr. Fisher received an unidentied shot that was not recorded in his immunization records. Seven
years later, he's experiencing a spectrum of medical problems of unknown cause, problems so severe they
forced him to leave the Armed Forces. 50
Dr. Fisher is not alone. Since the Total Force Vaccination program commenced in 1998, over two million
doses of the anthrax vaccine have been dispensed to over 502,000 members of the Armed Forces.51 These
inoculations have resulted in over 1,530 federal complaints of adverse reactions of varying severity.52 Due to
the controversy over the anthrax vaccine, many service members have refused to take it, even though such
action usually means expulsion from the active arms services. According to the General Accounting Oce,
to date, twenty-ve percent of pilots and aircrew serving in the National Guard and the military air reserve
consent in advance).
4955 Federal Register 52,814 { 52,817 (December 21, 1990).
50Doctors vs. Anthrax Vaccine, Hartford Courant, May 14,2001, at A1.
51Dep't of Defense, supra note 32.
52Doctors vs. Anthrax Vaccine, supra note 50.
29units have been lost due to the anthrax controversy.53
In a memorandum from Major Sonnie Bates responding to court-martial proceedings initiated against him,
Major Bates questions the soundness of his Aerospace Medical Squadron Commander's assertion that Dover
Air Force Base has a \normal healthy population." Major Bates cited numerous examples of ill members of
Ninth Airlift Squadron:
53Id.
30\Michelle P. suered from thyroid damage, an autoimmune disorder, chronic fatigue,
and dizziness. She had been grounded for several months. Bill L. has also been grounded for
several months. After the vaccine, he developed cysts on numerous places on the inside and
outside of his body, to include his heart. He has undergone surgery to remove some of the
cysts and was hooked up to an IV for six weeks. He became incapacitated at the controls
of the airplane due to this illness. He was on a basic crew, so the other pilot basically ew
the airplane solo to Germany. Jean T. suers from a widespread rash over most of her body
since receiving the vaccine. Jim G. suers from severe chronic joint pain, thyroid damage,
and has an autoimmune disorder. Both of his arms are in braces due to the severe joint pain.
John S. has an autoimmune disorder. Jay M. has been grounded for several months. He has
been suering from crippling bone/joint pain, ringing in the ears, and memory lapses. He
has been battling various infections continuously during these past several months and has
developed 27 new allergies in the past few months. Dave H. experienced diverse symptoms,
which included chronic bone/joint pain, chronic fatigue, and a loss of ability to concentrate.
He has been cross-trained into another, less demanding career eld. Mike M. had been
grounded for eight months after receiving the vaccine. He has experienced eight seizures.
Other symptoms include crippling bone/joint pain, memory lapses, ringing in the ears,
dizziness, and an inability to concentrate. Ted D. suered recurring infections after the
vaccine and sustained thyroid damage and acute short-term memory loss. Jerry K. became
chronically ill and was grounded during his last months of service before retirement. Brian
B. suers from severe bone and joint pain. Recent bone scans reveal lesions on his spin,
pelvis, and ribs. Jim R. experienced chronic bone/joint pain. He said his arms frequently
go numb. He has been grounded for so long the medical group has questioned him about
a medical discharge. However, he is not interested in a medical discharge because he has
been in the military for over 17 years and does not want to lose his pension. Nathan P.,
after receiving the vaccine, has suered from lesions in his throat and X-rays have revealed
spots on his lungs. Cindy C. started experiencing episodes of vertigo, ringing of the ears,
and memory lapses. She has had ve vertigo episodes, described as being so severe that
she couldn't walk. The vertigo has ceased since the vaccine has stopped and she is on a
waiver to not receive any more anthrax vaccine until her health improves. She said that the
anthrax issue is one reason why she plans on not re-enlisting. Michael M. is in a military
hospital hooked up to a ventilator. He is paralyzed. He speaks with his eyes. The doctors
say it was from the u vaccine."54
31Severe adverse responses were not limited to the Ninth Squadron.
\Christy M., an airman from Kirtland AFB suers from blisters all over her body
after taking the vaccine. She was told it was from her laundry detergent and was ordered
to continue the series. Her condition worsened and she was sent to Wilford Hall, TX. While
there she was told she may have had a reaction to the vaccine, but was still ordered to
continue the series. The doctors gave her yet another dose and her condition worsened. She
is afraid. She doesn't want to take any more shots of this vaccine, but has been told she
must continue.
Jeanette L., an NCO at Beale AFB has been suering from chronic fatigue, heart
dysfunctions, cysts, and other infections since taking the vaccine. She says she feels as
though she is literally dying, while the clinic tells her she must continue the series of vaccines.
Kevin R., a service member in the navy has been in a coma since taking the vaccine
in December. He is at Walter Reed.
Kevin E., an Army specialist fell ill in Korea after receiving the shot. His body was
covered with blisters and bleeding sores. The Army had to treat him like a burn victim. He
was 28 years old at the time. This service member believes it was caused by the anthrax
vaccine.
32Joseph Jones, A 22 year old soldier from Ft. Benning received his rst anthrax
inoculation on 3/17/98 and began suering u-like symptoms, severe headaches, a rash over
arms, back, and chest, and bloody diarrhea which lasted a few days. Injection number two
came 3/31/98, he began suering the same type symptoms, only worse, when he went to
the medical facility he was put on antibiotics. Then came shot number three 4/14/98 while
still on antibiotics! All of this young man's inoculations came from Lot FAV020 (the expired
lot). Joseph Jones' mother, has described his blackouts as seizures with muscles tightening
and his eyes glazing over. Senator Phil Graham has begun an investigation of his case, and
the case number is #81103787. Epilepsy has been ruled out.
Mike K., an Army specialist stationed in Germany has been sick for months with
u like symptoms after taking the vaccine. He also suers from memory loss, blurred vision,
and diarrhea. No VAERS was led. He believes the vaccine has caused the illness. He has
not been diagnosed and no tests had been conducted on him at the time of his report. He
wanted help, but felt like no one was listening to him at the clinic. He did not want to take
another shot, but was told he had to.
Aubrey L., has suered from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome since 1974, when he was
given an experimental dose of anthrax vaccine while stationed at Guam AFB. He nearly
died. Later he was tested and shown to have been exposed to anthrax. He testied under
oath before Congress in 1996.
331Lt Mike H., started his Air Force career at Charleston AFB while awaiting his
JSUPT class start date at Vance AFB. While at Charleston, he started the anthrax vaccine
series. He then went to Vance AFB to start pilot training. He was told he had to continue
the shots since he started them. He graduated pilot training in January 2000, but is in the
process of being discharged for medical reasons for symptoms he believes was caused by the
anthrax vaccine.
A Wisconsin ANG member reportedly died from heart failure11 hours after receiving
the anthrax vaccine in Saudi Arabia.
Lou D., Marine Corporal at Camp Pendleton. His mother was called to his side
last 4th of July with the expectation he wouldn't survive. He was previously healthy, took
4th shot in April 99, proceeded to lose 17% of his body weight, then lapsed into a week long
coma. After recovering, he was told all his medical records were missing and he'd have to
start all his shots over again, including the anthrax shot.
Kali T., an Army member stationed at Ft Carson took the anthrax vaccine this
past September, went out almost immediately to play football, went home complaining
of headaches and couldn't sleep. He was transported via helicopter to Denver University
hospital where he experienced complete organ failure and lapsed into drug-induce coma for
2 weeks and went from 250 to 190 lbs. Army claims condition not related to the shot.
Peter M., 51, Kansas ANG at McConnell AFB. Experiencing temporary paralysis
after being told the anthrax shot would not be a problem just because he had polio as a
child. Being sent to Medical Evaluation Board for elimination from service.
34Sgt. Bill P., Kansas ANG, former weightlifter, diagnosed rst with pneumonia,
then mono, then parvo, then Lyme disease, and nally Lupus after receiving the anthrax
vaccine."55
Surely such severe side eects provide ample justication for
questioning the soundness of the AVIP and the vaccine itself.
.Dealing with Resistance
The military clearly considers vaccination refusal to be a discipline issue. The Department of Defense does
not, however, have a military-wide policy for dealing with service members who refuse the vaccine, and thus,
in the eyes of the military, a lawful order. Instead, local military commanders are instructed to apply the
principles in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.)56 and guidance provided in the Manual for
Courts-Martial and Service Regulations.
Although certain airforce bases have posted outlines detailing the possible repercussions from refusing to be
vaccinated with AVA, the outlines tend to be vague. At Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, a posting states
that failures to obtain required immunizations are handled by the member's commander. The commander
has a full range of options to deal with the situation, from taking no action to taking punitive action
under the UCMJ.57 Furthermore, both active and reserve members refusing to take required vaccinations
are subject to discharge.58 Waivers are granted on an extremely limited basis and are restricted to certain
medical conditions, including hypersensitivity to vaccines and pregnancy, and \legitimate religious objection
56The U.C.M.J. is a federal law forming the basis of the military justice system. It states what qualies as criminal conduct,
establishes the various types of military courts, and sets forth procedures to be followed in the administration of military justice.
57\Anthrax Immunizations," <http://www.dallasnw.quik.com/cyberella/Anthrax/Notice.html> (visited April 20, 2001).
58Id.
35to immunization."59
Action under UCMJ article 90, \Willfully Disobeying a Superior Commissioned Ocer,"60 is appropriate
where the refused order was given by the member's commanding ocer.61 When a service member is
charged with willful disobedience of a lawful order, the order is presumed to be lawful unless patently
illegal.62 Challenging the lawfulness of an order is an issue of law to be determined by a military judge as
an interlocutory matter.63 Decisions by the Court of Military Appeals are given great deference as it was
Congress' intent to create a military justice system of integrated military courts with sucient familiarity
with military problems to handle these specialized issues in uniform fashion.64
Service members refusing the vaccine are nding themselves \prosecuted alongside drug users, thieves and
rapists."65 The punishment dealt for refusing the vaccine has been severe: ve marines enlisted at Twenty
Nine Palms, California, received bad-conduct discharges; an airman in Texas was sentenced to 21 days in
the brig, had his pay docked $ 500, and was discharged from the Air Force; and ve members of the Ohio
National Guard were discharged over the issue.66
In Camp Pendleton, California, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew D. Perry was charged with violating an
order to take the AVA series.67 Corporal Perry was denied the opportunity to introduce evidence at trial
concerning the safety and ecacy of the vaccine on the grounds that Secretary of the Naval Instruction
6230.4 (stating that AVA is an FDA-licensed product) precluded this inquiry and thus informed consent
59Dep't of Defense Directive 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Svcs (June 18, 1985).
6010 U.S.C. x 890.
61U.S. v. Felix, CMA 1994, 40 M.J. 356, cert denied 115 S. Ct. 906.
62Manual for Courts Martial, Part IV, Para. 14c(2)(a)(i) (1998).
63U.C.M.J. Art. 51(b) (1988).
64See Schlesigner v. Councilman, 420 US 738, 758 (1975).
65Anthrax Shots Bad Medicine? Vaccine's Possible Perils Listed in Military Papers, San Diego Union Tribune, June
29, 1999 (quoting Lance Corporal Jared Schwartz, of Henderson, Kentucky, court-martialed and sentenced to a bad conduct
discharge and forty-ve days in the brig).
66An Airman's Vaccination Becomes Test of Loyalty, The Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 2000.
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36is not required for its administration.68 Accordingly, anthrax immunization is therefore mandatory and
service members who refuse are subject to military discipline.69 The U.S. Navy Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals denied his petition for a writ of mandamus on November 29, 2000. An appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court on the grounds that prosecution for refusing the vaccine was a violation of Corporal Perry's
constitutional rights of access to the legal system and jury trial was rejected on March 19, 2001, without
comment.
The Supreme Court's decision to deny cert in Colonel Perry's case is not, however, surprising. The Court has
repeatedly declared that constitutional rights adverse to military interests are subject to greater limitations
than in a civilian context.70 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to state that provided a regulation can
reasonably be interpreted to be \relevant and necessary to the national defense" or otherwise promotes a
valid government interest, it will survive constitutional attack.71 The military prevails when there is any
reasonable basis for the action taken. Not all service members, however, consider the AVIP program to be
a reasonable action.
There's a dierence between being willing to give your life and sacricing your health over a mismanaged
government contract.72 Air Force Major Sonnie Bates refused the anthrax vaccine at Dover Air Force Base,
Delaware, in November 1999. He is the highest-ranking active-duty military ocer to turn down the vaccine.
Rather than face court-martial, he chose to end his fourteen year career with the armed services in March
2000 and accepted a general discharge under honorable conditions in addition to a ne.73
68Id.
69See also Ponder v. Stone, 54 M.J. 613 (2000).
70See Brown v. Glass, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1986); see also Parker v. Levy 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974).
71Mack v. Rumsfeld, 609 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
72Air Force Major Sonnie Bates, Court Martial In Anthrax Clash, CBS News, Los Angeles, Oct.4,2000
<http://www.cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,149811-412,00.html>
73Air Force Doctor, Former Pilot Sue to Have Anthrax Vaccine Declared Experimental, Stars and Stripes, May 4, 2001.
37U.S. Air Force physician Captain John Buck faces court-martial proceedings at Keesler Air Force Base,
Mississippi, for refusing the military's controversial anthrax vaccination. He is the rst physician to refuse to
take the anthrax vaccine. He remains willing to be deployed in areas where anthrax is a potential concern and
even oered the military complete indemnication from liability should he contract the disease, in addition
to waiving his rights to a $200,000 life insurance policy.74 He was told these were not options, however, that
he was still required to take the vaccine.
On May 2, 2001, Major Bates and Captain Buck led suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia against the Defense Department and several other agencies seeking to have the AVA ocially
declared an IND.75 The lawsuit, the rst to target the FDA's role in the AVIP, maintains that such classi-
cation is mandated by the FDA's failure to authorize the vaccine for use as protection against biological
warfare and cites the numerous health violations and safety concerns relating to AVIP.
Ramications of Continuing AVIP
Legislation has been proposed to immediately halt the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program of the
Department of Defense. Across the country, service members and their families are anxiously awaiting the
decision. It is not enough that they have been given some breathing room by the Program slow-down
resulting from insucient vaccine delivery by BioPort. There is a perceived need for a full cessation of the
inoculations. However, there is a strong possibility that the Program will proceed. If this should happen,
there are several ramications that can be expected.
74Doctors v. Anthrax Vaccine, supra note 50.
75Lawsuit on Anthrax Vaccinations Targets FDA Role, Wash. Post, May 3, 2001, at A22.
38The rst result of resumption of the vaccination Program is one that has been stated repeatedly in Congres-
sional testimony by service members among the various Branches. There will be an increase in resignations
and optioned retirements to avoid the vaccination requirement. The greatest aect will be in Reserve Corps,
more of who have the option to leave service than in the full-time Forces. These men and women will assess
the risks versus their military careers and easily see a long-range benet to retirement. It would do none
of them well to accept the vaccine only to nd that in a short time, they have become sick, untreatable by
civilian insurance, and unt for civilian or military responsibilities. Among the full-time Forces, there will
be a continued presence of vaccine refusers who will face Military Judicial Action, culminating in expulsion
from the service. While these men and women will preserve some of their health, they will be stigmatized
by the legal action against them. This will follow them through life much as a civilian criminal record would
follow them, aecting future career and lifestyle opportunities. Regardless of which Corps loses the member,
Reserve or Active, the net result will be a diminished troop readiness. This may be compounded further
by reluctance of new recruits to join the Forces based upon fear of the vaccination Program. Fewer troops
necessarily means a weaker National Defense.
Even if all the potential refusers and all prospective recruits can be assuaged in their fears of the vaccine,
the Program is left with the problems of the vaccine itself. Insucient protection is aorded by improper
administration of a weak vaccine. If the supply is suciently bolstered to allow for Total Force Immunization
as delineated by the Program, the question of the vaccine ecacy will remain. Technical analysis has
shown that the vaccine is of poor quality, requiring numerous bolstering steps and excessively frequent re-
immunization. The possibility of incomplete protection and misplaced faith in a weak vaccine will leave the
Forces open to severe decimation in the event of an actual attack with anthrax. This again means a weaker
National Defense.
39Also for consideration is the long-term cost for collateral damage caused by the vaccine. As the Government
has seen from its use of Agent Orange, decades after deployment serious and severe health issues can arise.
Precedent has been shown to hold the Government liable for incurred medical costs. With the rising numbers
of service members, this potential cost rises exponentially. It may be penny-wise but pound-foolish to
implement AVIP at the current time without knowledge of the long-term associated eects of this particular
vaccine. The vaccine costs about $10 a dose, or less than $100 for a typical four-year tour of duty. This
is inconsequential to the potential of millions of dollars as reparations that might be paid in class-action
lawsuits. Even in human costs, estimates suggest that it is unlikely that anthrax attack would destroy the
entire Force structure, but by mandating complete compliance across the Force, there is the potential for far
more people to be aected by the vaccine.
The cost of the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program will be higher than the projected $200 million of
the actual shots. There will be a cost in manpower, readiness, and liability dollars. As the Department of
Defense is fond of saying, they are in the business of \Recruitment, Retention, Readiness, and Morale."76
Certainly these tenets are at odds with the continued deployment of the anthrax vaccine.
76Statement of Charles L. Cragin, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Aairs.
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